

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
Thursday, 19 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

GE.93-62156 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 662nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before I proceed with our business for today I would like to bid farewell to one of the members of the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament who has been working with competence and dedication since he first came to the secretariat of the Conference in 1982. I refer to Mr. Michael Cassandra, who discharged his responsibilities in full as secretary of the Ad Hoc Committees on a Nuclear Test Ban and on Radiological Weapons, as well as of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. He has also helped me personally during the 1992 session when I, as Special Coordinator on the question of transparency in armaments, was carrying out enlarged and informal consultations on behalf of the Conference. He is now joining the Office for Disarmament Affairs at United Nations headquarters in New York and I believe that he can leave us with the feeling of having carried out his responsibilities and of having done a difficult job with competence and utmost dedication. On behalf of the Conference, I wish him and his family every success and personal happiness.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Ukraine and Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, the chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, who will introduce his reports on those consultations. We also have the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who will introduce the progress report of that subsidiary body.

Mr. SLIPCHENCKO (Ukraine): Mr. President, in congratulating you on the assumption of the presidency of this distinguished forum, I would like to stress that there have been few periods in the history of the Conference on Disarmament when the significance of this post was greater than it is now, with the Conference nearing the end of its 1993 session. There are good reasons to believe that in the course of this concluding part the Conference under your presidency will secure and develop positive results attained at an earlier stage under the guidance of your highly esteemed predecessors. I wish you and all participants in the Conference every success in these endeavours, to which my delegation is ready to contribute in a constructive way.

Assessing the achievements of the current session, we should undoubtedly refer first of all to the adoption by the Conference of the landmark decision giving its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable document. It is perfectly clear at this moment that the road leading to the eventual conclusion of a CTBT will be an arduous one, but it is equally evident that by having embarked upon it the Conference has reaffirmed its unique status as the most authoritative negotiating body on disarmament and international security.

This brings the Conference at least one step closer to the fulfilment of its ultimate mandate, which is to be reaffirmed as universal and complete disarmament. However distant and even elusive this goal might seem, it will never lose its moral allure of an historic challenge confronted by humanity. It is within this conceptual framework that we regard a CTBT as an extremely

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

important instrument of the reinforcement of the international regime of non-proliferation and thus of raising the level of stability in the development of the entire system of international relations. I would say in this connection that the role of the Conference should not be perceived as the one of the guardian at the doors of the nuclear club. It should be always aware of its general mandate, which is reflected in the very name of the Conference on Disarmament.

Sincere desire to further this cause constitutes the core of Ukraine's approach to disarmament and international security issues. In view of the frequent attempts to misrepresent our position, which have noticeably intensified of late and have been voiced even in this forum in the most inappropriate manner, I can state with the utmost clarity that my country confirms its commitment to acquire a non-nuclear status and fulfil its international obligations. This has been declared more than once and on many occasions at the highest level of my country's political leadership. The Guidelines of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine recently adopted by the Ukrainian parliament contain a special clause stipulating Ukraine's rejection of the very possibility of use of nuclear weapons alongside its advocacy of nuclear disarmament. I quote: "Having become by virtue of historic circumstances the owner of nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR, Ukraine will never sanction their use and strikes the threat of use of nuclear weapons from the arsenal of its foreign policy". The text of the Guidelines is being distributed by the secretariat at our request, together with the text of my statement.

The seriousness of our intentions has been already proved by the fact that, having voluntarily announced its intention to become a non-nuclear State, Ukraine has taken a series of practical steps in this direction. Ukraine agreed to place nuclear weapons situated on its territory, pending their destruction, under the operational control of the Joint Command of the CIS Strategic Forces, on condition that it kept control over the non-use of these weapons. Ukraine removed ahead of schedule all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory for the purpose of their dismantling and subsequent liquidation. Ukraine consented to place under IAEA control all relevant objects on its territory even prior to Ukraine's accession to the NPT. It was Ukraine which put forward at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus as early as in April 1992 a proposal to sign an international document which would become a basis for the equal participation of these States in START; the Lisbon Protocol emerged as a result of this process.

Nobody can accuse us of not participating in all negotiations aimed at bringing about tangible results. Neither should anyone neglect the fact that Ukraine has effectively neutralized eventual use of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, which is now situated on its territory. Taking into consideration volatile developments in a number of neighbouring countries, including that in possession of nuclear arms, it can be scarcely presumed that immediate transfer of the nuclear missiles from Ukraine elsewhere would by itself diminish nuclear risks and enhance non-proliferation.

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

Respecting international obligations voluntarily assumed by our country and being convinced that they conform to its highest national interests, the President of Ukraine submitted to the parliament a proposal concerning ratification of the above-mentioned Treaty and Ukraine's accession to the NPT. Thus the legislative process has been started and it has been developing so far according to the procedures common to the majority of other parliamentary bodies. It can be recalled that the process of ratification of START 1 in the United States Senate, for instance, lasted about a year. Also American experts negotiated it over the course of nine years. The level of the expertise of the parliamentarians should be also taken into account.

One could hardly expect from Ukraine adoption of "rubber-stamp" decisions on the matters related to the most sensitive aspects of its national security, especially in the contemporary geo-political context when our very territorial integrity is being repeatedly called in question by the legislature of the neighbouring State. But even in cases when our borders are officially recognized, it is always conditioned by the continuing membership of Ukraine in the CIS. Mutual confidence is further undermined by such arbitrary decisions of Russia as liquidation of the Joint Command of CIS Strategic Forces established by the common decision of the heads of State of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This action constitutes an overt violation of the Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces, invalidating the agreement per se. It is exactly this Agreement that the representative of the Russian Federation alluded to in his presentation on 5 August 1993, however, having omitted essential details.

He also failed to mention another unilateral decision made by the Russian Minister of Defence. In February this year it abolished the units which were responsible for storage and maintenance of nuclear warheads located in the territory of Ukraine. Russian authorities have already been deliberately refusing for one year and a half to provide these units with components and spare parts which are to be periodically replaced in order to ensure safety of nuclear warheads. Under these circumstances, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine was virtually left with no choice but to incorporate two of these units into the Forty-Third Army of the CIS Strategic Forces in order to guarantee the safety of the process of dismantling nuclear warheads. Another lapse of memory on the part of my Russian colleagues comes to no surprise that it obversely contradicts his bill of indictment presented here on 5 August and on some other occasions.

The present scarcity of material and financial resources constitutes another crucial factor undermining the pace of Ukraine's movement towards acquiring non-nuclear status. It should be recognized that Ukraine is unable to carry out destruction of nuclear weapons on its own because this will put on it a burden estimated at approximately US\$ 3 billion - far too great for a transitional economy to bear, adversely affecting the process of reform, aggravating the current economic crisis and the hardships of the population, and substantially limiting possibilities for dealing with the aftermath of Chernobyl disaster. The latter accounts for a third of the Ukrainian national budget.

(Mr. Slipchencko, Ukraine)

Ukraine's position essentially differs from that of other countries which are yet to join the NPT because it has to deal with the nuclear weapons already stationed in it. Having been denied the opportunity to take part in shaping the policies concerning production and deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil at the time, Ukraine and its people are presently facing a situation when they have to fulfil international obligations in accordance with a treaty which was also negotiated without their participation. At the same time, implementation of this treaty corresponds to the national interest of all nuclear States and the international community at large. We consider these reasons grave enough to justify, *de facto* and *de jure*, Ukraine's request for resources for the purposes of the implementation of START I being addressed first of all to the most interested nations. Their contribution to the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine could be made in the form of economic, financial and technical assistance. We are grateful to the United States Government for its readiness to provide \$175 million for these purposes, although this sum definitely and unfortunately falls too short of the real needs. The international fund for nuclear disarmament of which we have proposed the creation could play an instrumental role in mobilizing international support for this noble cause.

Not waiting foreign assistance, Ukraine has already engaged in preparatory work aimed at implementation of START I and the Lisbon Protocol. To be more precise, my country is ready to negotiate with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus the issue of distribution of the limits and restrictions concerning strategic offensive weapons established for the former USSR by virtue of the Lisbon Protocol. Recurring attempts by Russia to reach an agreement on this issue on a bilateral basis are being regarded by Ukraine as unacceptable because they contradict the principle of equality of obligations under the Lisbon Protocol.

Ukraine has also taken preliminary steps in preparation for its accession to the NPT. In september 1992, supporting IAEA activities for providing comprehensive safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, in his letter addressed to the Director-General of IAEA, informed him of Ukraine's readiness to apply corresponding guarantees to all nuclear installations on the territory of Ukraine.

Ukraine's accession to the NPT calls for measures in order to create a national system of accounting and control over nuclear materials and to ensure their physical protection, the training of personnel and the establishment of an inventory of nuclear facilities. We will need time and appropriate assistance to achieve these goals.

In a more general sense, Ukraine considers its accession to the NPT to go far beyond a mere political declaration, striving to ensure that the Treaty's coming into force is accompanied by the resolution of all issues related to the elimination of nuclear weapons on its territory. My country has previously agreed to place nuclear weapons currently in Ukraine under the Joint Command of the CIS Strategic Forces, but we have never recognized them to be the property of any other State, Russia included. Neither are we going to do that in future.

(Mr. Slipchencko, Ukraine)

Having no intention to acquire control over the use of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices - in conformity with article II of NPT - Ukraine, however, has every legitimate right of ownership to all the property of the former USSR on its territory. This includes the property of the armed forces and their strategic nuclear forces branch and all physical components of nuclear warheads, including both strategic warheads still deployed on Ukrainian territory and tactical warheads removed to Russia in spring 1992 for dismantling and elimination. This right of ownership extends to the repossession of all nuclear substances extracted from the dismantled warheads situated on Ukrainian territory on conditions which will preclude their further use for the creation of nuclear weapons but will enable, on the other hand, their utilization for peaceful purposes. In view of the shortage of fuel available for Ukrainian nuclear power stations and persistent difficulties in ensuring a sufficient energy supply, Ukraine cannot afford to neglect several billion United States dollars' worth of resources contained in nuclear warheads. So my country's determination to exercise its right of ownership in relation to physical components of the nuclear warheads on its territory is motivated primarily by dire necessities of the Ukraine economy, which is going through an extremely painful transformation period.

Ukraine's approach to this problem not only follows the line of its internal legislation, but also rests upon the solid foundation of the generally accepted norms of international law codified in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States of 1983. My country has consistently demonstrated political will to work out legal formulae and technical arrangements acceptable to all parties involved. According to the latest information, a corresponding Ukrainian-Russian agreement envisaging reprocessing at Russian enterprises of the nuclear fuel from the missiles situated on Ukrainian soil is well on its way.

Regrettably, the conclusion of the cold-war chapter of human civilization still has not made the world a safe place to live. Adherence to forceful methods of international conduct has turned out to be tenacious. Being fully aware of the complexities of the modern international political scene and the existing dangers to its independence, Ukraine, like many other States, is looking for the most efficient ways to ensure its national security. In voluntarily relinquishing nuclear weapons, the so-far most potent deterrent, Ukraine can expect to obtain reliable guarantees of its security. This problem has been the subject of intensive consultations with the United States since April 1992, followed by those with the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China.

Unilateral declarations of an exclusively political nature are, however, regarded by my country as inadequate. It rather seeks truly international guarantees which should be provided in the form of a multilateral, legally-binding agreement to which Ukraine and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will be the parties. According to the draft agreement elaborated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the permanent members of the Security Council would assume an obligation to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukrainian borders and to refrain from the use of force or the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. In

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addition to that, the agreement might incorporate an obligation on the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from the use of their armed forces against Ukraine with the exception of cases of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. In our view, this document should also include a special provision envisaging the mechanism of extraordinary consultations among the parties to the agreement when the national security of Ukraine is endangered.

Willingness to reach an agreement on the international guarantees attests exclusively to the genuine desire of my country to resolve the issues pertaining to the nuclear weapons in Ukraine in a good spirit and without unnecessary delay. In the same spirit we support the efforts being made within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and its corresponding ad hoc committee to design effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear States against the peril of nuclear weapons. We are ready to work efficiently towards achieving this goal and we hope that the above-said guarantee agreement could be an important contribution to the negotiating process on this issue.

We are equally committed to being an active part of the multilateral effort to negotiate a CTBT, which has entered a practical phase, and to looking for new approaches in order to ensure progressive development on other issues and the efficient functioning of the Conference itself. Recent proposals tabled at this forum by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan, could provide Ukraine and other countries with new opportunities in this respect. I hope that the Conference will not fail to submit to the General Assembly a consensus decision on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of Ukraine, Ambassador Slipchenko, for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the Chair.

On my list of speakers we have next Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan, the chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Ambassador Kamal will introduce his report on those consultations. This is the report that has been circulated to you in document CD/WP.446.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan), I take the floor to present the report on the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament circulated as document CD/WP.446.

Since its initiation in 1990, the exercise of consultations on improved and effective functioning has progressed well and made some significant contributions. During the current year also, as in previous years, lively and constructive debate has taken place on the various issues identified for consideration.

I am happy to report that agreement has emerged in important areas: on guidelines for drafting the reports of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies; on the maintenance of the present system of the rotation of the presidency and its current four-week tenure; on the continuation of the

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present practice in which the incumbent President associates the outgoing as well as the in-coming Presidents in all consultations, including the Wednesday presidential consultations; on a continued adherence to the rule of consensus in the Conference; on the computerization of Conference documents, with a view to eschewing duplication and cutting down on the avoidable expenditure by making use of the existing optical disk system facility in coordination with the United Nations Disarmament Affairs Information System.

Our common exercise has once again proved its utility by making tangible recommendations. The desire of members to continue these recommended consultations and to keep the improved and effective functioning of the Conference constantly under review shows the importance attached to this exercise. I commend the report for adoption.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Kamal for his statement concerning his report on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. In conformity with the practice of the Conference, I intend to invite the Conference to take note of that report, and that at a later stage of our work.

I now give the floor to Mr. Dalman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, who will introduce his progress report on the work of the Ad Hoc Group. This report has been circulated in document CD/1211.

Mr. DALMAN (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): I am pleased to report today on the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group, held from 26 July to 6 August 1993, and to introduce the Group's progress report, which is contained in document CD/1211.

The session was attended by experts and representatives from 29 countries. The broad participation in the group, with translation into all United Nations languages and an increased amount of working documents, put an increased burden on the secretariat. The Group appreciates the efforts by all concerned to cope with this situation.

Mr. President, let me at this time join in the words of appreciation that you expressed to Mr. Michael Cassandra, who is leaving Geneva today, for the outstanding contribution he has made over the years to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

Before commenting on the progress report, it might be appropriate at this moment to briefly summarize the GSE activities. The Group of Scientific Experts was established by the CCD in 1976 to consider international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Through its initial work, the Ad Hoc Group established the basic principles and the general structure for the international exchange of seismological data for monitoring purposes. The guiding principles and the general structure have remained essentially unchanged despite the almost revolutionary technical development of the system that has taken place.

The system has consisted since its beginning of a global network of seismological stations connected through national data centres to an

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international data centre. The system has been looked upon as a service facility for participating countries by providing easily accessible data collected on a global scale for national assessment. The system and its International Data Centre are not supposed to make any final assessments as to the nature of the event, that is, to distinguish between earthquakes or explosions.

In the early days the system was based on the exchange of parameter data obtained through the analysis of regional recordings at national data centres. These parameter data contained the information to allow the detection and location of the event by the International Data Centre. The reporting also contained a so-called identification parameter, describing, for example, the shape or the frequency content of the signals, to assist participating countries in the interpretation or identification of events. A lot of work was done at that time to develop and test suitable such identification parameters. This limited reporting constrained to parameter data only, which corresponded to about one written page per day, was partly due to the limited technical data transmission capabilities of those days. The main reason was, however, the political concern at the time about exchanging large volumes of original recordings.

The political climate has changed and the constraints have been lifted. Over the years the system has gradually been developed through research efforts, through the installation of new technical facilities in individual countries and through efforts within the Group to modernize the system so as fully to utilize the scientific and technological developments. The experimental system now being proposed by the Group thus differs considerably from the original system, not only in technical design, but also in capability.

The new system which was presented to the Conference on Disarmament following the Group's meeting in February this year is based on the on-line transmission of data from a global network of high-quality stations to an advanced International Data Centre. The system is designed to meet far-reaching technical and operational requirements. Most of these stations are array stations, where many sensors are emplaced to form an antenna to improve signal detection. This primary, or Alpha network is supplemented by a larger number of stations, referred to as the Beta network, from which data is retrieved by the International Data Centre as required. Individual countries may contribute additional data, called gamma data, as they see fit in order to facilitate the analysis of an event.

The system is thus now based on the on-line exchange of complete recordings, which means that all information is available to all participants. This has made the exchange of special identification parameters, which was a most essential element in earlier versions of the system, unnecessary, as such parameters can be calculated from the original data in a manner that suits the actual need by the individual countries receiving this data.

The Group has, during its session, elaborated functional requirements for the components of this new International Seismic Monitoring System. These elaborations have been based on material provided by a number of working

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groups. Several of these working groups have thereby finalized their work. An annex attached to the progress report summarizes these elaborations. This annex presents the objectives and the overall concept of the system, which I have already briefly outlined. It further contains the technical specifications for the stations to be used and for the International Data Centre. Based on the experience from previous tests and on results of computer simulation, the GSE now proposes a specific network of 52 Alpha stations to be used in the forthcoming experiment, which we refer to as GSETT-3. GSETT-3 thus differs substantially from previous large-scale tests as the Group now proposes a specific network. This experimental network has an estimated detection threshold of about magnitude 3.5 in most parts of the globe, somewhat lower on the continents. To achieve a detection threshold on magnitude 3.5 and even somewhat better in most parts of the world is the most significant improvement of today's capability. GSETT-2, which utilized data from available stations and which did not attempt to create an optimized network, provided a detection capability of magnitude 4.5 or less. This means that the experimental network now proposed is estimated to have a detection capability at least 10 times that obtained during GSETT-2.

Annex 1 contains a tentative distribution of the Alpha stations, containing 27 array and 25 three-component stations, based to the extent possible on existing facilities. This distribution may be somewhat modified during the further planning of the experiment. Those countries which have stations that will form part of the experimental network are urged to make formal commitments to contribute these facilities to GSETT-3.

The Group has established a tentative plan and schedule for the implementation and testing of the experimental system. The intention is to start the full-scale testing on a global scale by 1 January 1995. Work is already under way, not only to define the system and the functional requirements of its components, but also to develop the experimental International Data Centre in the United States.

The Ad Hoc Group has established three working groups with great responsibilities to handle GSETT-3: one for planning, one for operation and one for evaluation. As GSETT-3 is to be a major undertaking by the Group, the overall coordination will be conducted by the Chairman and the Scientific Secretary. The Group is paying special attention to a continuing evaluation of the test to be able to provide the Conference on Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with experience and results as GSETT-3 evolves.

The Group considered during its session the cost of establishing and operating seismological systems and focused on the experimental system to be utilized during GSETT-3. In my presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 5 August, I discussed the issue of cost estimates at some length and I will today only briefly summarize the Group's present analysis, which is annexed to the progress report.

The Group stresses that careful analysis is required to make cost estimates with reasonable accuracy. Such an analysis must be based on fairly detailed knowledge, not only of the geographical extent of the system but also

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of the operational requirements such as reliability, security and redundancy. Estimates of investment cost for stations in virgin areas are quite uncertain, as the main part of the cost usually is not instrument or equipment cost but rather construction cost or cost of necessary infrastructure, which may be quite difficult to estimate without careful site surveying. The running costs for a given facility could vary considerably from one country to another depending on labour cost and also on administrative regulations, which, for example, makes transmission cost, which is a significant running cost, several times higher in one country than in another. The administrative overhead, which depends on the organizational framework of the system, could also be a most significant part of the overall cost. The Group has made estimates of the investment and running cost of the experimental network to be used in GSETT-3. As this network is based to a large extent on existing facilities, these estimates should be fairly accurate. The experimental network proposed makes maximum use of early investments estimated to be about 150 million United States dollars. New investments needed to bring the system up to the desired station distribution and technical quality are estimated at 20 million dollars. This includes 3 million dollars of new investment in the prototype IDC now being established in the United States. The total running cost of the entire system is estimated at 25-30 million dollars per year. The Group has not discussed how these costs should be covered.

The Group received during its session briefings from individual delegations on activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, especially on its hearings on non-seismic verification techniques. These presentations were much appreciated, and I hope this dialogue between the Committee and the Ad Hoc Group will be developed. To this end, the Group decided to invite the Chairman of the Committee to its next session to present issues dealt with by the Committee that are relevant to the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

The Group received and discussed proposals for work on seismic event identification methods and non-seismological monitoring techniques and a proposal for the expansion of the mandate of the Group to include also considerations of non-seismological methods. No consensus was reached on these proposals. It was, however, agreed that I should undertake informal consultations on these issues and report the result at the next session of the Group.

Informal technical meetings held between the Group's formal sessions have over the year contributed significantly to the progress of the Group. The Group noted with appreciation that two such technical meetings had been convened since the Group's previous session. One meeting, hosted by Italy in Rome from 1 to 3 March 1993, was focused on seismological procedures. The other meeting, hosted by the United States in Landsdowne, Virginia, from 29 June to 2 July 1993, considered issues related to the planning of GSETT-3. Many participants in the Group attended and contributed to these two meetings. As to the continued contacts with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Group appreciated the offer of Dr. Duma of Austria to act as a contact person to maintain informal contacts with IAEA. The Group had earlier similar arrangements with the World Meteorological Organization.

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The Group considers that the establishment and testing of the proposed experimental system which we refer to as GSETT-3 is a logical next undertaking. GSETT-3 will provide valuable information and experiences that continuously could be made available to the Conference on Disarmament and to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The experimental system will also provide an infrastructure that might prove valuable in the establishment of the ultimate verification system.

The Ad Hoc Group has been serving the Conference on Disarmament for 17 years. When the CD now is focusing its efforts on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Group is ready to continue serving the Conference to the best of its ability and to carry out the tasks entrusted to it. To that end, the Group suggests that its next session be convened from 7 to 18 February 1994 in Geneva or at the date that is most responsive to the needs of the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group recognizes that, depending on the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, it may become necessary to meet more frequently than in the past.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Mr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for the presentation he has given us of this valuable progress report. You will notice that the progress report contains in its paragraph 13, a suggestion to the effect that the next session of the Group be convened in Geneva from 7 to 18 February 1994, that is next year, or at a date that is most responsive to the needs of the Conference on Disarmament. This suggestion, of course, relates to the recent decision of the Conference to give to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is in that light that we should understand the last sentence of paragraph 13 which the Ad Hoc Group recognizes that, depending on the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, it may be necessary for this Group to meet more frequently than has been the case so far and in the past. However, for the moment we should consider the dates recommended by the Ad Hoc Group, keeping in mind the possibility of adjusting these dates depending on the arrangements of the Conference. And therefore at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 26 August, I will put to you a recommendation concerning the dates for the next session of the Group, with the proviso that those dates might be adjusted in order to respond to the needs of the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, I wanted to associate myself with your words of gratitude concerning the presentation of the report just made by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Dahlman, and to thank the Group of Scientific Experts for the very productive work which it has done to date.

I am also obliged to refer to the statement made by the distinguished representative of Ukraine. First of all, I want to thank him for his statement, which, in the part dealing with Ukrainian-Russian relations, not only confirmed, but furnished additional justification for the deep concern that the Russian Federation feels with respect to the negative aspect of the Ukrainian leadership's present policy both as regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and as regards nuclear stability in the

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world in general. I also would like to inform you that we have requested the authorities of the Conference on Disarmament to distribute as an official document the statement of the Government of the Russian Federation regarding the most recent developments of the nuclear policy of Ukraine.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, in connection with your statement on Mr. Michael Cassandra, who will soon leave us, I asked for the floor to register my deep appreciation as the Chairman of the NTB Committee of the work done by him during his tenure of office here, especially of the cooperation he rendered to me as Secretary of the Committee. Without his experience and efficient assistance we would not have been able to achieve the progress we have made so far. I wanted to retain him as Committee Secretary as long as I could, but since he will be promoted to a higher post in New York, I wish to congratulate him for the success in his career and express once again my sincere thanks to him.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Tanaka of Japan for the statement in which he expressed his thanks and appreciation for Mr. Michael Cassandra. At the beginning of the meeting I also expressed my appreciation to Mr. Cassandra for all the assistance he rendered to me last year within the framework of the informal consultations carried out by the Conference when I was acting as Special Coordinator for the Conference on Disarmament on the question of transparency in armaments. I would like to repeat once more my full appreciation for his efforts.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This does not seem to be the case.

The secretariat has distributed today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week, that is, from 23 August. It is hoped that the reports of the subsidiary bodies will be adopted as far as possible on Monday, 23 August. I hope to have the cooperation of all members to achieve that deadline. If this turns out not to be possible because of exceptional circumstances, which we all hope will not be the case, we may still have time left for two meetings on Tuesday, 24 August. I would recommend that we do not consider Wednesday as a possibility, since we will otherwise impose on the technical services of the Conference the impossible task of processing all parts of the annual report to be presented by the CD to the General Assembly simultaneously.

For your information, the technical parts of the draft annual report will be circulated in the official languages beginning from Monday morning, 23 August, until Tuesday morning, 24 August, in time for consideration at the informal meeting on Thursday, 26 August.

(The PRESIDENT)

Of course, in the light of the stage reached in our work at the Conference, the timetable which has been circulated is merely indicative and it may be changed if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): That concludes our work for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 August, at 10 a.m. sharp. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.